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1. Introduction 
 
Recently, an increasing number of central banks have become more transparent about 
their objectives, procedures, rationales, models and data. Central bank transparency and 
independence are actually considered as the best practice in monetary policy, distinguishing 
central banking today from central banking in earlier historical periods. Independence is 
justified as a way of permitting the appointment of central bankers who are more conservative 
than the median voter in order to offset the inflationary bias that results from inability to pre-
commit. With the grant of independence, come demands for adequate accountability and 
hence more transparency. Nonetheless, the behaviour of independent central banks is quite 
heterogeneous in information disclosure (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2006; Demertzis and 
Hughes-Hallet, 2007). 
Empirically, it is not clear whether transparency strongly affects the average level of 
inflation and output gap, while it remains difficult to establish its effects on inflation and 
output gap variability. According to Chortareas et al. (2002), disclosure of inflation forecasts 
reduces inflation volatility at the expense of a rise in output volatility. Demertzis and Hughes-
Hallet (2007) have found that greater transparency increases inflation variability, but has a 
less clear effect on output volatility and no effects on average levels of inflation and output. 
The analysis of Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) suggests broadly favourable if relatively weak 
impacts on inflation and output variability. 
The transparency of central bank decision-making has also received a growing attention in 
the theoretical literature. Most economists are instinctually of the view that more information 
is better than less, and therefore agree that openness and communication with the public are 
crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policy, because they allow the private sector to 
improve expectations and hence to make better-informed decisions (Blinder, 1998; Blinder et 
al., 2001). It has also been argued that more openness reduces uncertainty for players on 
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financial markets and makes future decisions more transparent (Issing, 2001). Adding 
distortions, some researchers have provided counterexamples where information disclosure 
reduces instead the possibility for central banks to strategically use their private information 
and greater transparency may not lead to a welfare improvement. In effect, according to the 
theory of the second best, removing one distortion may not always lead to a more efficient 
allocation when other distortions are present. For example, information asymmetries between 
the public and the central bank about the weight that the latter assigns to each target in its 
objective function may affect trade union behaviour, induce wage moderation (Sorensen, 
1991) and decrease both the level and the variance of inflation (Grüner, 2002). In a 
framework where the public attempts to infer the central bank’s type from information on 
policy outcomes, incomplete transparency can be optimal as a result of a trade-off between 
the effect on the central bank’s reputation and its consequent ability to control inflation on the 
one hand, and the private sector’s wish to see output, employment and prices stabilised on the 
other hand (Faust and Svensson, 2001; Jensen, 2002). Starting from a position where both 
private and public information are imperfect, Morris and Shin (2002) show that greater 
precision of public information can lead individuals to attach inadequate weight to private 
information in the presence of coordination motives among private agents. For others, certain 
restrictions on transparency are important for operational reasons in order to reinforce the 
credibility of central banks (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts, 2002).  
Models focusing on monetary policy transparency typically consider two players, the 
monetary authority and the private sector. Departing from this approach, some researchers 
study the relationship between central bank transparency and the institutional design (Walsh, 
2003; Hughes Hallett and Weymark, 2005; Hughes Hallett and Libich, 2006; Geraats, 2007). 
Moreover, several authors introduce monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Hughes Hallett 
and Viegi (2003) examine the case where the government and private sector both face 
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asymmetric information about central bank preferences. Considering a Nash game between 
the government and the central bank, they find that uncertainty about the ‘political’ preference 
parameter reduces average inflation, whereas uncertainty about the ‘economic’ preference 
parameter has no effect on average. When fiscal policy is endogenous and the government’s 
political preference parameter is determined by democratic elections, their results suggest that 
a lack of transparency is likely to lead to a more left-wing government that cares less about 
inflation stabilisation. Assuming that the government is a Stackelberg leader, Ciccarone et al. 
(2007) have shown, in a unionised economy with supply-side fiscal policy, transparency has 
two contrasting effects on economic performance. Uncertainty about central bank preferences 
leads to a reduction of unions wage claims but also produces a fully-anticipated expansionary 
fiscal policy which favours the setting of higher wages.  
In this paper, considering that the impact of central bank transparency should not be 
viewed as independent from fiscal policymaking, we investigate the interaction between the 
common central bank (CCB) and the national fiscal authorities in a monetary union. The 
motivation for explicitly analyzing the links between national fiscal policymaking and the 
central bank transparency comes from the challenge faced by the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). The EMU is not only characterized by a single central bank and several independent 
national fiscal authorities, but also by a significant informational asymmetry between the 
central bank and the national fiscal authorities. Since the ECB is independent and strictly 
focusing on the primary objective of price stability, national governments are incited to 
increase the public expenditures financed by higher distortionary taxes in order to stabilize the 
economy. This justifies hence the introduction of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 
order to enhance the credibility of the ECB. It is documented that the communication of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) is systematically critical of populism in fiscal policy-decision 
and encourages prudent fiscal policies since they could provide considerable support for 
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confidence in the euro area (see e.g. Rosa and Verga, 2007). In so far as uncertainty about 
central bank objectives affects the discipline of fiscal authorities in the sense of reinforcing 
the effectiveness of the SGP, it may (or may not) have a positive impact on price stability and 
inflation uncertainty. Thus, understanding the interactions between fiscal and monetary 
policymaking in the monetary union is of major importance. This paper provides one attempt 
towards this goal. 
In a monetary union with supply-side fiscal policies, the timing of the game is as follows: 
First, each national government sets the value of the fiscal instrument; then the private sector 
forms its expectations about inflation and fixes the wage rate; and finally the CCB chooses the 
value of the monetary instrument to attain the inflation target. The government is a 
Stackelberg leader taking into account how CCB is likely to react to its policy choice. In 
adopting the above sequential timing, we agree with the view that the Stackelberg equilibrium 
concept is the one that better captures fiscal and monetary interactions (Beetsma and 
Bovenberg 1998; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). 
The main conclusion we reach is that if the CCB is conservative, an increase in 
transparency about the CCB preference will positively affect the supply-side fiscal policies 
decided by decentralised fiscal authorities. In contrast to the study of Ciccarone et al. (2007) 
where the opacity has expansionary effects on fiscal policy, the opacity about the CCB 
preferences may have here a disciplinary impact on the fiscal policies of national governments 
which internalize the influence of their actions on the common monetary policy. Furthermore, 
an enlargement of the monetary union would reduce the disciplinary effect of opacity if the 
monetary union is already relatively large and the CCB quite conservative and could increase 
inflation and output-gap variability. Our results suggest that introducing opacity in the ECB’s 
communication could reinforce the disciplinary effect of the SGP on the member countries in 
encouraging less distortionary supply-side fiscal polices and structural reforms, but generally 
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at the cost of higher level and volatility of inflation and unemployment. However, this 
disciplinary effect of opacity could be attenuated by the enlargement of the EMU. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the model and construct 
the policy game between national fiscal authorities and the CCB of the monetary union. In the 
section after, we solve it under a Stackelberg sequence of players’ moves. In the fourth 
section, the equilibrium properties of the economy are studied in analyzing the effects of 
political transparency on the levels of tax rate, inflation and output gap, under different 
assumptions on the “type” of CCB (more or less conservative) and on the stance of national 
fiscal policies. Finally we take into account the impact of the enlargement of the monetary 
union on the effects of transparency. In the fifth section, we offer some insights on the effects 
of transparency on macroeconomic stabilisation. We conclude in the last section. 
 
2. The model 
 
There are n symmetric economies in the monetary union. Each economy (or member 
country) is characterized by two players: the government (fiscal policy-maker) and the private 
sector. Monetary policy is delegated to the CCB, while fiscal policy is decided independently 
at a decentralized level by the national governments. The model is formulated in logs. Output 
gap, ix , in each country i ( ni ,...,1= ) is a positive function of surprise inflation eππ −  (where 
π  is the inflation rate and eπ  the expected inflation of the private sector) and  a negative 
function of distortionary tax rate, iτ , on the total revenue of firms1: 
                  i
e
ix τππ −−= .      (1) 
                                                 
1 See Alesina and Tabellini (1987) for a complete derivation of this supply function. 
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Equation (1) captures the case of supply-side fiscal policy in including the possibility for it to 
influence the aggregate supply of output.2 In effect, there is a distinction to be made between 
supply-side instruments (fiscal or others) in the hands of governments, which can have 
permanent effects on the level of output, and demand side (fiscal) interventions which would 
not have any long run impacts (except on the level of prices). To capture the case of demand 
side fiscal policy we need to replace iτ  by its deviation from its expected level ( eii ττ − ) in 
equation (1). The presence of iτ  could also represent non-wage costs associated with social 
security or job protection legislation; or the pressures caused by tax or wage competition on a 
regional basis; or the more general effects of supply-side deregulation (Hughes-Hallett and 
Viegi, 2003). Hence, it allows covering a whole range of structural reforms in our analysis. 
Taxes and supply-side restrictions are systematically non-neutral in their effects on output and 
hence distortionary in the sense of depressing output and employment more than surprise 
inflation can improve them. The inclusion of iτ  in equation (1) reflects hence the concern of 
the ECB about fiscal restraint and structural reforms in the EMU, even though its decisions 
would only be indirectly (via output gap) affected by whether those restraints/reforms were 
undertaken.  
Each government’s loss function is defined over inflation, output gap and public 
expenditure ( ig ) deviations from the targeted ratio of public expenditure over output ( g~ ). We 
assume that g~  is the same across the member countries of the monetary union. A government 
i ’s loss function is 
                                                 
2 This idea, which has been increasingly employed in the recent literature, can be justified in several different 
ways as summarized by Ciccarone et al. (2007) who consider the presence of fiscal deficit instead of the tax 
rates. Fiscal deficit may have permanent effects on output if maintained through time through its impacts on 
public production. It can also represent a public investment raising the private sector productivity, or a 
production subsidy to the firms, a measure of social security or non-wage costs imposed on employers, or taxes 
on labour, or the costs of supply side constraints, or market restrictions, or job protection legislation imposed on 
producers.   
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2
1 222
, ggxL iiiG −++= γφπ , φ , 0>γ ,   (2) 
where the parameters φ  and γ  correspond respectively to the weight assigned to the inflation 
and government expenditure objectives. In setting the public expenditure level, each national 
government faces a balanced budget constraint:  
iig τ= ,                  (3) 
in which we neglect the seigniorage component of the budget and the debt service payments3. 
Since we study the effect of transparency on the tax rates and the levels of public expenditures 
at equilibrium, we include an explicit budget constraint into the model. In ignoring the shock 
affecting the supply function and in imposing the balanced budget constraint, we choose not 
to study how the public deficit responses to the economic shocks and to the transparency.4   
We adapt the standard analysis of Barro and Gordon (1983), and Rogoff (1985). 
Following Rogoff, we assume that national governments, while keeping control of its fiscal 
instrument, delegate the conduct of monetary policy to the CCB with more conservative 
preference than society would itself vote for.  
Since the CCB is an independent central bank, it is unlikely to be made responsible for 
public expenditure deviations ( ggi ~− ). Thus, the CCB is only concerned with the union-wide 
output gap i
n
i i xx ∑ == 1μ  (where each country i has a relative weight iμ , so that 11 =∑ =ni iμ ) 
and inflation rate π . We assume that CCB sets its policy in order to minimize the following 
loss function: 
                                                 
3 An extension is to consider a more refined budget constraint as Beestma and Bovenberg (1998) in taking 
notably account the effect of fiscal policies on inflation and hence on seigniorage revenue that could be 
attributed to national governments. For given public expenditures, fiscal authorities could reduce the tax rate if 
the inflation and hence the seigniorage revenue is higher. These supply-side fiscal policies are inflationary and 
therefore increase their seigniorage revenue. 
4 Our approach is different from Hughes-Hallett and Viegi (2003) and Ciccarone et al. (2007). They do not 
include an explicit budget constraint into the model, but constrain fiscal policy by placing penalties on its use 
through the introduction of deficit in the government’s utility function, with the weight of such penalties being as 
influenced, among other things, by specific institutional constraints imposed on fiscal policy (e.g., the SGP).  
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1 22 βπ+= xLCCB ,     0>β ,       (4) 
where β  is the relative weight that the CCB places on the inflation target and it might be 
different from that of national governments. It is therefore an index of conservatism (larger β  
values) versus liberalism or populism (smaller β  values). The CCB’s policy instrument is π . 
In practice, the CCB would use interest rates. But since the standard theoretical models 
assume that nominal interest rates have no systematic long-run influence on output, we may 
as well use π . Even if taxes are distortionary, we do not include an inflationary bias in the 
objective function of the CCB, reflecting ECB’s primary objective which is to ensure price 
stability, not to correct a shortfall in output due to the distortionary effects of taxes or supply-
side restrictions for social reasons. 
It is possible to consider that the preference parameter β  is not perfectly predictable by 
the national governments and the private sector. This uncertainty is likely to be larger if the 
CCB is run by a collegiate body, such as the ECB (Hefeker, 2006). In terms of the model, this 
imperfect disclosure of information about the CCB preference is represented by the fact that 
β  is a stochastic variable. We assume that the distribution law of β  is characterised by 
ββ =][E  and 22 ])[()var( βσβββ =−= E . The variance 2βσ  represents the degree of opacity 
about the CCB preference. When 02 =βσ , the CCB is fully predictable and hence perfectly 
transparent about its preferences (Canzoneri, 1985; Cukierman and Meltzer, 1986).5 Finally, 
taking into account that national governments are weighting less the inflation target than the 
CCB, we admit that φβ >  or φεφβ +=  with 0>φε . 
                                                 
5 An alternative way to model the lack of transparency is to consider a non-observable output target or control 
errors (see Faust and Svensson 2001, 2002; Jensen 2002). But this will have no effect in average as in Hughes-
Hallet and Viegi (2003) except when we introduce as Walsh (2003) a nonlinear term in the CCB’s loss function.  
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We remark that Ciccarone et al. (2007) opt for an alternative specification of central 
bank’s loss function in order to avoid the arbitrary effects of central bank preference 
uncertainty on average monetary policy (see Beetsma and Jensen, 2003). In effect, a slight 
change in the uncertainty specification (e.g., the placement of the stochastic parameter in front 
of one or the other argument of the central bank’s objective function) can lead to radically 
different effects on average monetary reactions. However, the uncertainty specification 
adopted in this paper seems to be preferable for analysing the interactions between the ECB 
opacity and fiscal policymaking in the EMU because the ECB is strictly focusing on the 
primary objective of price stability assigned by the Maastricht Treaty and gives little attention 
to the output objective. Suppose that we assign a weight ξαα −=  to the output target and 
ξββ +=  to the inflation target in the CCB’s loss function, with 1=+ βα , and α  and β  as 
their respective perceived average value (Geraats, 2002). In the case of the ECB, the 
parameter α  can be assumed to be very small in average, and the variance of ξ  ( 2ξσ ) must be 
very small since we have ασξ ≤2  according to Ciccarone et al. (2007). Thus, our first remark 
is that there is an asymmetry between uncertainty about output and inflation targets. When 
0→α  and 1→β , if the variance of α  is high in comparison to α , the variance of β  will 
be small when comparing to β . That could lead to an over-compensation of the effects of 
opacity about β  by these related to α . Our second remark is that a very small value for α  
implies automatically a very small variance of ξ  and hence a high level of transparency for 
the ECB. In other words, an attribution of low weight to output gap target leads to the 
evacuation of transparency issue. 
 
3. Equilibrium 
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The game is solved by backward induction. Minimisation of the CCB’s loss function (4) 
with respect to inflation, under the constraint of equation (1), yields the following reaction 
function: 
   β
τππ +
+=
1
e
,          (5) 
where i
n
i i
τμτ ∑ == 1  is the union-wide average tax rate. The term β+1 1  represents the CCB’s 
reaction with respect to inflation expectation and the tax rate, and is decreasing in β . 
Equation (5) implies that the CCB reacts to higher expected inflation and higher tax rate with 
a higher inflation rate.  
Rational inflation expectations of the private sector, given τ  fixed by national 
governments, are estimated using equation (5): 
   ].
1
[][ β
τπππ +
+==
e
e EE       (6) 
When predicting future inflation, the private sector and national governments, are not 
perfectly informed about the CCB preference. 
Taking into account the stochastic nature of the parameter β  and using a second-order 
Taylor development, we obtain:6 
),(
)1()1(
1
3
2
τπβ
σ
βπ
β +⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+++=
ee       (7) 
and it follows therefore: 
         ,
])1[( 22
Θ
++= τσβπ βe          (8) 
                                                 
6 The second-order Taylor development implies that 3)1(
22)1(
1
1 ][ β
βσβ
β +
++
+ ≈E  and ≈+ ][ 2)1( 1βE  
...][ 4)1(
2)(3
3)1(
)(2
2)1(
1 ++− +
−
+
−
+ β
ββ
β
ββ
βE 4)1(
232)1(
β
βσβ
+
++= .  Demertzis and Hughes Hallett (2003) use an approximation of four 
moments but assume the third and fourth moments are very small. Consequently, our results are robust relative 
to higher order moments. 
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where .0)1()1()1( 22223 >−+=−+−+≡Θ ββ σββσββ  We admit for the general case that 
0>Θ  since according to the Taylor approximation, 1][1 1)1(
)1(
3
22
<≅ ++
++
ββ
σβ β E . Substituting eπ  
given by equation (8) into equation (5) yields: 
Θ+
+=
)1(
)1( 3
β
τβπ  .       (9) 
Then, substituting eπ  and π  given by equations (8) and (9) respectively into equation (1), we 
obtain the output gap of country i as a function of tax rates fixed by national governments: 
       .])1(
)1(
)1([ 22
3
iix τσββ
βτ
β −−+−+
+
Θ=         (10) 
Finally, incorporating ig , π  and ix , given by equations (3), (9) and (10) respectively, into 
equation (2) yields the following loss function for the government i: 
      .)~(
2)1(
)1(
2
)1(
1
)1(
2
1 2
232
22
3
, gL iiiG −+⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
Θ+
++⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ −Θ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−+
+= τγβ
τβφττσββ
β
β  (11) 
A symmetrical solution to the problem of the government i (i.e. all member countries have the 
same weight, ni
1=μ , and then ττ =i ) is obtained as follows: 
           .
)1()1](3)1[(])1[(
 ~ 
2222222
2
n
gn
i Θ++++++−+
Θ= γβσβφσσβ
γτ
βββ
    (12) 
Equation (12) represents the fiscal rule adopted by national governments in the presence of 
uncertainty about the CCB preferences. Since 0>Θ , it yields that the optimal level of tax rate 
is always positive ( 0>τi ). The equilibrium value of tax rate (and hence the level of public 
expenditures) in each country depends on the variance of β  ( 2βσ , i.e. the degree of 
transparency) as well as its average values (β , i.e. the degree of conservativeness or 
independence of the CCB). 
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Substituting iτ  given by equation (12) into equations (9) and (10) leads to the following 
equilibrium solutions for inflation and output gap: 
n
gn
2222222
3
)1()1](3)1[(])1[(
)1(~  
1
1
Θ++++++−+
+Θ
+= γβσβφσσβ
βγ
βπ βββ  ,  (13) 
n
gnxi 2222222
3
)1()1](3)1[(])1[(
)1(~  
1 Θ++++++−+
+Θ
+−= γβσβφσσβ
βγ
β
β
βββ
.  (14) 
Equations (12)-(14) immediately clarify that the issue of transparency is relevant only if there 
is fiscal distortion (i.e. 0~ >g ) and the weight that each government assigns to the expenditure 
objective (γ ) is relatively high. The higher is γ , the higher are inflation and unemployment. 
At the same time, a higher β  implies higher unemployment and lower inflation, in line with 
the standard result obtained by Rogoff (1985). As shown by equations (13) and (14), the 
solutions of inflation and output gap share a common part including the variance 2βσ  which 
represents the opacity. Because the effects of opacity on both unemployment and inflation are 
either positive or negative, we focus on inflation in the following. 
Before analyzing the effects of opacity on fiscal policies, inflation and output gap, it is 
useful to briefly discuss the case of perfect transparency (i.e. 2βσ  = 0 and ββ = ). 
Introducing 2βσ  = 0 and ββ =  in equations (12)-(14) and taking account of the definition of 
Θ , we obtain: 
n
gn
i 2
2
)1(
 ~ 
βγφ
βγτ ++= ,           (15) 
n
gn
2)1(
~
 βγφ
γβπ ++=  ,         (16) 
n
gnxi 2
2
)1(
~
βγφ
γβ
++−= .       (17) 
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We remark that, by assumption, the well-known inflation bias problem in the standard Barro-
Gordon model is absent in this framework. However, active national governments introduce a 
fiscal bias through a wage expectation effect. In fact, as they attempt to increase output 
through higher public expenditure ( g~ ), which is finally financed by higher distortionary tax 
according to equation (15), the workers claim higher nominal wage since the marginal cost of 
unemployment for the CCB is lower. In effect, for unchanged inflation rate and inflation 
expectations (unchanged wage claims), the output gap will be lower and unemployment 
higher after an increase in tax rate. At equilibrium, inflation increases and output gap 
decreases as shown by equations (16) and (17). Equations (15)-(17) also predict that the more 
the national governments are populist (i.e. φ  is low or γ  is high), the higher are tax rate, 
inflation and unemployment. That explains why the ECB is concerned to promote fiscal 
restraint and structural reforms in the member countries of the EMU. In effect, a fiscal policy 
oriented to stabilizing inflation is required in order to mitigate workers’ claims.  
Furthermore, we note that when β  is high, the CCB does not stabilize enough the output 
and hence the national governments are incited to increase the public expenditures financed 
by higher distortionary taxes. This has a negative effect on the credibility of the CCB. That 
could rationalise the introduction of the SGP in the EMU in the first place and explain then 
why the ECB tends to be less transparent with regard to its communication. 
 
4. Transparency, national fiscal policies and inflation 
 
Using equations (12)-(14), we evaluate the effects of transparency on the supply-side 
fiscal policies of member countries and the macroeconomic performance. Furthermore, we 
examine how these results are affected by the enlargement of the monetary union. 
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Proposition 1. If the CCB is sufficiently conservative, then an increase in transparency about 
the CCB preference has a positive impact on the tax rate in the monetary union. 
 
Proof.  Using equation (12), we derive iτ  with respect to 2βσ  as follows: 
  22222222
22222
2 })1()1](3)1[(])1[({
])1)(31(2[])1(2)31[()1(~
n
gni Θ++++++−+
+++−+++Θ++Θ−=∂
∂
γβσβφσσβ
σβφβσβφφβγσ
τ
βββ
ββ
β
. (18) 
The above derivative is negative under the condition: 13 +> φβ  (i.e. the central bank is 
sufficiently conservative). Since an increase in transparency is reflected by a decrease in 2βσ , 
the tax rate ( iτ ) will increase according to equation (18).  Q.E.D. 
 
The result summarized in Proposition 1 can be explained as follows: Given the tax rate, an 
increase in opacity (i.e. an increase in 2βσ ) has a positive direct effect on expected inflation. 
Taking the derivative of eπ  given by equation (8) with respect to 2βσ  leads to:  
   0)1( 2
3
2 >Θ
+=∂
∂ βτ
σ
π
β
e
.       (19) 
Since equation (5) shows that inflation is convex in β , expected inflation increases with 
uncertainty about β  due to Jensen’s inequality. National governments, being aware of the 
positive effects of opacity on workers nominal wage claims, will always decide to moderate 
their tax rate (supply-side fiscal policy) in order to stimulate output if they expect that the 
CCB is quite conservative, i.e. 13 +> φβ . We note that the last condition is a sufficient one. 
When the CCB is less conservative (i.e. 13 +< φβ ), 2βσ
τ
∂
∂ i  could also be negative. Our result 
suggests that the lack of transparency of the ECB reinforces the fiscal policy discipline in the 
EMU and could be complementary to the SGP.  
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Proposition 2. The enlargement of the monetary union has a positive effect on the tax rate in 
the monetary union. If fiscal policymaking is already relatively decentralized and the CCB is 
quite conservative, the enlargement weakens the disciplinary effects of opacity on the supply-
side fiscal policies of member countries. 
 
Proof. Using equation (12), we take derivative of iτ  with respect to n as follows:  
 ,
})1()1](3)1[(])1[({
})1](3)1[(])1[({~ 
22222222
2222222
n
g
n
i
Θ++++++−+
++++−+Θ=∂
∂
γβσβφσσβ
βσβφσσβγτ
βββ
βββ
  (20) 
which is positive for 0>Θ  and 22)1( βσ>β+ .7  
We derive 2
βσ
τ
∂
∂ i  given by equation (18) with respect to n  as follows:  
32222222
2222222
2
2
})1()1](3)1[(])1[({
})1( )1](3)1[(])1[({~
n
ng
n
i
Θ++++++−+
Θ+−++++−+ΓΘ−=∂∂
∂
γβσβφσσβ
γβσβφσσβγ
σ
τ
βββ
βββ
β
  (21) 
where ])1)(31(2[])1(2)31[()1( 22222 ββ σβφβσβφφβ +++−+++Θ++≡Γ , which is positive 
if 13 +> φβ  as is assumed previously. The above cross-derivative is positive 
for 2
222222
)1(
)1](3)1[(])1[(
 Θ+
++++−+> γ
βσβφσσβ βββn , given that 0>Θ  and 22)1( βσ>β+ . Q.E.D. 
 
In the presence of more fiscal policymakers in the union (i.e. larger n), each government 
internalizes less the influence of its own behaviour on the CCB’s reaction. Generally, in the 
case of perfect transparency, both an increase in the number of independent fiscal authorities 
and a more conservative CCB lead national governments to have more supply-side fiscal 
                                                 
7 When we calculate the variance of inflation, the condition 22)1( βσβ >+  ensures the convergence of 
Taylor development series as well as a positive value for the approximate estimation of the variance of inflation.    
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policies (or higher distortionary tax rate). The second part of Proposition 2 states that the 
disciplinary effect of uncertainty about the CCB’s reaction on supply-side fiscal policies is 
weakened by an increase in the number of fiscal policy-makers in a monetary union. In effect, 
according to Proposition 1, when the CCB is more opaque, given the number of fiscal 
authorities, the tax rate decreases. However, the enlargement of the monetary union will 
attenuate this effect due to its positive impact on the tax rate. In the opposite, the 
centralization (or fewer independent fiscal authorities) allows internalizing more the uncertain 
reaction of the CCB to fiscal policymaking. 
When the governments have higher preference for expenditures (i.e. higher γ ) or are 
more populist (i.e. smaller φ ), the tax rate will be increased. This can be shown in deriving iτ  
with respect to φ  and γ  using equation (12) as follows:  
  0
})1()1](3)1[(])1[({
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22222222
22222222
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n
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,   (22) 
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γβσβφσσβ
βσβγ
φ
τ
βββ
β
.   (23)  
The signs  of γ
τ
∂
∂ i  and φ
τ
∂
∂ i  are determined under the sufficient condition 0)1( 22 >−+ βσβ . We 
note that the signs of these effects of parameter changes on the tax rate are not dependent on 
the opacity but their levels are.  
  
Proposition 3. In the presence of a conservative CCB, greater monetary policy uncertainty 
increases the inflation and reduces the output gap when the size (n) of the monetary union is 
sufficiently large, the governments’ preference for inflation (φ ) is sufficiently low and their 
preference for expenditures (γ ) is sufficiently high. 
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Proof:  Using equation (13), we derive π  with respect to 2βσ  as follows:  
    ,
})1()1](3)1[(])1[({)1(
)1( ~  
22222222
3
2 n
gn
Θ++++++−++
+Ψ=∂
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γβσβφσσββ
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 (24) 
where 4222222 )1()31()(]2)1[()1()1( βφβσσβββγ ββ ++−−−++−Θ+=Ψ n .  
Since φεφβ += , with 0>φε  (i.e. the CCB is more conservative than the national 
government), we have φεβφ −= . Substituting φ  by )( φεβ −  in Ψ , we get: 
    .)1)(31()()1(2)1)(32()1( 4222242 φεββσσβββββγ ββ +++−++++−Θ+=Ψ n    (25) 
Equations (24) and (25) imply that that the inflation rate is positively related to opacity 
( 02 >∂∂ βσ
π ) if: 
.)()1(2)1()32()1)(31()1( 2222442 ββ σσβββββεββγ φ ++−++>+++Θ+ n    (26) 
Under the condition 22)1( βσ>β+ , the right hand of (26) is positive. When the parameters  n ,  
γ  and φε  are sufficiently high in the sense that condition (26) is verified, then monetary 
policy uncertainty increases inflation. Moreover, using equation (14) to derive ix  with respect 
to 2βσ , we can easily show that the output gap decreases with opacity ( )02 <∂
∂
βσ
ix  when 
condition (26) is satisfied.  Q.E.D.  
 
More uncertainty about the CCB preferences incites national governments to reduce their 
supply-side fiscal policies and public expenditures. According to equation (5), this leads to a 
decrease in inflation expectations and therefore a decrease in current inflation. However, this 
effect is dominated by the positive direct effect of an increase in opacity on the current and 
expected inflation when the size (n) of the monetary union becomes sufficiently large, the 
governments’ preference for inflation is sufficiently low (high value for φε ) and their 
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preference for expenditures is sufficiently high (i.e. high value for γ ). However, as the 
current inflation increases less than the expected inflation, the output gap will be reduced. In 
effect, an increase in the number of member countries weakens the governments’ perception 
about the impact of their actions on the union-level inflation. Furthermore, if the governments 
have a lower preference for inflation and a higher preference for expenditures, they will have 
less incentive to reduce their tax rates and public expenditures. Consequently, an insufficient 
reduction in tax rates will not diminish enough the expected and hence realised inflation to 
counterbalance the direct inflationary effect of opacity. 
The sign of 2βσ
π
∂
∂  depends on the initial level of 2βσ  as well as the values of parameters 
characterising the size of the monetary union and the governments’ preferences (i.e. n , γ  and 
φ ). Some further insights could be obtained by examining the derivatives of π  with respect 
to these parameters. Given 2βσ , the impacts of an increase in n, φ  and γ  on π  are derived 
using equation (13) as follows: 
0
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The derivatives given by equations (27)-(29) show that, independently of the initial degree of 
opacity, the effects of increases in n  and γ  on inflation is positive while an increase in φ  
diminishes the inflation rate. Consequently, the results reported in Proposition 3 will be 
reversed under conditions opposite to these imposed to verify the inequality (26).  
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In particular, we now consider more specifically the role of the size of the monetary 
union. Given the degree of opacity, a change in the size of the monetary union can reverse the 
effects of opacity on the inflation rate. To obtain 02 <∂∂ βσ
π , the size of the monetary union 
must satisfy the following condition according to equation (24): 
  2
422222
)1(
)1)(31(])1[()1(223
Θ+
++−++++Θ+Θ< γ
εββσβββσ φββn ,      (30) 
For the condition (30) to have a sense, its right side must be superior to 2, the minimal size for 
a monetary union. This is possible when γ  and φε  have small values. 
If n  is sufficiently large so that condition (30) is reversed, then we have 02 >∂∂ βσ
π . In other 
words, an increase in n  reinforces the effects of opacity on the inflation rate. That can be 
confirmed in deriving twice π  with respect to 2βσ  and n  as follows:  
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 ;  (31) 
We note that under condition (26) as well as that 22)1( βσβ >+ , the cross-derivative of π  
with respect to 2βσ  and n  is positive. In the case where 1=n , 0=φε , the partial derivative 
2βσ
π
∂
∂  could also be negative, if the following condition is fulfilled:  
   2
5)1(20 Θ
+<< ββγ .        (32) 
In this case, more monetary policy uncertainty will decrease the inflation and increase the 
output gap. Similar discussions could be done for φε  in the case where we consider n  and γ  
as given. 
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5. Transparency and macroeconomic stabilisation 
 
Another aspect of macroeconomic performance is the stabilisation of macroeconomic 
variables, measured in terms of volatility around equilibrium levels. Denote the variances of 
inflation and output gap by 2πσ  and 2ixσ respectively. They are obtained using equations (13) 
and (14), and the second-order Taylor development as follows: 
        .
})1()1](3)1[(])1[( {
])1[()~ (
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22
n
gn
ix Θ++++++−+
−+Θ== γβσβφσσβ
σβσγσσ
βββ
ββ
π  (33) 
Since these two variances have the same expression, we denote them by 2, ixπσ in the 
following. Equation (33) precisely accounts for the impact of opacity on macroeconomic 
volatility. It is straightforward to see that if 2βσ  approaches zero, the macroeconomic 
volatility ( 2, ixπσ ) also tends to disappear. This is explained by our assumption that the only 
source of uncertainty in the model is the one related to the CCB preferences.  
 
Proposition 4. If the opacity is initially low, then an increase in opacity implies higher 
inflation and output-gap variability. For a given degree of opacity, an increase in the size ( n ) 
of the monetary union as well as an increase in the governments’ preference for inflation (φ ) 
and for expenditures (γ ) will induce an increase in inflation and output-gap variability.  
 
Proof. Using equation (33), we take derivative of 2, ixπσ with respect to 2βσ  as follows: 
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The sign of 2
2
,
β
π
σ
σ
∂
∂ ix is positive if the opacity is initially low. In effect, when 02 →βσ , we 
have: 
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with 20 )1( ββ +=Θ . 
The impacts of an increase in n, γ  and φ  on 2, ixπσ are derived using equation (33) as 
follows: 
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The above derivatives are all positive if .0)1( 22 >−+ βσβ  Q.E.D. 
 
According to equation (36), given the degree of opacity, an increase in the decentralization 
of fiscal policies, reflected by a greater size of the monetary union (n), leads to a higher 
variability of inflation and output gap. A larger number of independent fiscal authorities will 
reinforce the effect of monetary policy uncertainty on inflation and consequently the 
variances of inflation and output gap. Using equation (35), we derive 2
2
,
β
π
σ
σ
∂
∂
ix  (evaluated at 
0
2 =βσ ) with respect to n as follows: 
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In effect, when the union becomes larger, each government cares less about the effect of its 
own fiscal policy on the expected inflation and hence on the union-wide macroeconomic 
performance. As a result, an enlargement of the monetary union reinforces the effect of 
opacity on the inflation rate. Equations (37) and (38) show that an increase in γ  and φ  
implies a higher variability of inflation and output gap in inducing more ample fluctuations in 
tax rate and hence expected inflation. 
When the CCB decided to increase the opacity about its preferences, it accepted lower 
equilibrium inflation (and output gap) in exchange of greater macroeconomic instability. If 
the equilibrium level of inflation (and output gap) was increasing (and decreasing 
respectively) in opacity, there would be no such trade-off between the equilibrium levels and 
volatility of inflation (and output gap) with respect to the degree of opacity. In that case, the 
most desirable situation is that the CCB should be fully transparent ( 02 =βσ ) if we exclude 
the issue of fiscal bias.  
We have previously shown that the inflation rate can be negatively related to the opacity 
for some values of the parameters charactering the preferences of the CCB and national 
governments. If this is the case, the CCB will face a trade-off between the variance and level 
of inflation (and output gap) beyond the consideration of the disciplinary effect of opacity on 
national fiscal policies, since according to equation (35), we have 02
2
, >∂
∂
β
π
σ
σ
ix  for an initial 
degree of opacity that tends to zero.  
More precisely, according to equation (34), to ensure that 02
2
, >∂
∂
β
π
σ
σ
ix , n must be 
sufficiently large so that: 
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For small 2βσ  and φε , there exists a size of the monetary union (n) for which the conditions 
(30) and (40) are simultaneously checked. Consequently, we could have 02 <∂∂ βσ
π  and 
02
2
, >∂
∂
β
π
σ
σ
ix , and the trade-off between the variance and level of inflation could be possible.  
However, when the values of n , γ  and φε  are sufficiently low, and the initial value of 
2
βσ  sufficiently high, an increase in opacity can have negative effect on the volatility of 
inflation and output. For example, in the case where 1=n  and βφ =  (i.e. 0=φε ), the sign of 
2
2
,
β
π
σ
σ
∂
∂
ix  is negative if the following condition is checked: 
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If 22 )1( ββσ β +→ , the numerator of the fraction at the right hand of inequality (41) tends to 
92 )1()1(4 βββ +−  and the denominator tends to zero. If 01 >− β , it follows that 
0)1()1(4 92 >+− βββ  and the denominator tends to zero from the right side, and vice versa. 
We conclude that there exists an interval of values for 2βσ  so that the right hand of (41) is 
positive.  
Comparing conditions (32) and (41) and considering the limit case where 
22 )1( ββσ β +→ , we find that the right hand of condition (41) is less restrictive than that of 
condition (32). Then, for some values of 2βσ , the following interval is valid:   
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According to our previous discussions, in the above interval, inflation increases with opacity 
while its variance decreases with it. If the government puts an intermediate weight, which is 
in the interval defined by inequality (42), on the objective of public expenditures and the 
initial degree of opacity is high, the CCB can make the trade-off by diminishing the degree of 
opacity, leading to an increase in the variance of inflation but a decrease in its level. However, 
if the value of γ  is found to be in the interval defined in condition (32), such trade-off will 
not be possible. The condition 22 )1( ββσ β +→  can be interpreted as the CCB being more 
opaque and hence 2βσ  takes high values. Or alternatively, this condition can be checked if the 
relative weight that the CCB assigns to the inflation target ( β ) is perceived to be low. A low 
value of β  implies that the CCB is perceived to be populist. 
Similar discussions about the possibilities of trade-off between the levels of inflation and 
output gap and their volatility could be undertaken for the extreme case where we 
alternatively fix n  and γ , and study the sensibility of the results with regard to variations of  
φε . 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we study the link between decentralized supply-side fiscal policies in a 
monetary union and uncertainty about the CCB preferences. We have shown that an increase 
in transparency about the CCB preferences will positively affect the tax rates decided by 
decentralised fiscal authorities if the CCB is sufficiently conservative. In other words, the 
opacity may have a disciplinary effect on the fiscal policies of national governments which 
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internalize the influence of their actions on the common monetary policy. An enlargement of 
the monetary union has a positive effect on the tax rate for a given degree of opacity. It 
weakens the disciplinary effects on member countries if fiscal policymaking in the monetary 
union is already relatively decentralized and the CCB is quite conservative. 
An increase in opacity has a positive effect on inflation and a negative effect on output 
gap only when the size of the monetary union is sufficiently large, the governments’ 
preference for inflation target is sufficiently low and their preference for expenditures is 
sufficiently high. When the opacity is initially low, an increase in the opacity induces 
unfavourable effects in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation since it implies higher inflation 
and output-gap variability. However, for some level of opacity and intermediate values of the 
government’s preference for expenditures, more opacity could on the contrary reduce the 
macroeconomic volatility. Finally, given the degree of opacity, an enlargement of the 
monetary union as well as an increase in the governments’ preferences for inflation and 
expenditures would also lead to higher inflation and output-gap variability. 
The policy implication of our results is that the lack of transparency of the ECB has 
disciplinary effects on national fiscal policies, enhancing thus the effectiveness of the SGP, 
but generally at the cost of a higher level and volatility of inflation and unemployment. 
However, these effects are weakened by the entry of new member countries in the EMU.   
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